

La performance démocratique de la représentation indirecte

Séminaire de travail - Axe 1
Marc André Bodet (U. Laval)

Plan de la présentation

1. Le défi de la mesure dans l'étude de la représentation politique.
2. Les travaux de Huber et Powell (1994)
3. Les données CSES
4. Les répliques empiriques
 - Blais & Bodet (2006), Powell (2009), Golder & Stramski (2010), Golder & Lloyd (2014), Ferland (2016)
5. Où en sommes nous?
 - Blais, Guntermann, Bodet (2016)

Le défi de la mesure...

- Depuis les travaux de Pitkin (1967), la recherche empirique s'est organisée autour de quatre formes de représentation:
 - Formelle (délégation et imputabilité), symbolique, descriptive et substantive.
- En fonction de la forme de représentation étudiée, des questions de recherche émergent...

Le défi de la mesure...

- Dans notre cas, nous nous intéressons à la représentation substantive, et plus particulièrement à la **congruence** entre le positionnement idéologique des citoyens-électeurs et des élus.
- On dira alors qu'un système de représentation **indirecte** est plus performant qu'un autre si les citoyens-électeurs sont plus proches (**congruence**) des élus.
- C'est donc un critère relatif.

Le défi de la mesure...

- Il faut choisir une variable observable:
 - Experts, Électeurs, Plateformes électorales, etc.
- Il faut choisir un critère statistique:
 - Médiane, Moyenne, Moindres carrés, Distributions, etc.
- Il faut choisir un échantillon de cas comparables.
- Il faut choisir une période de temps.

Huber et Powell (1994)

CONGRUENCE BETWEEN CITIZENS AND POLICYMAKERS IN TWO VISIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

By JOHN D. HUBER and G. BINGHAM POWELL, Jr.*

A more reasonable justification for democracy, then, is that, to a substantially greater degree than any alternative to it, a democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful process by means of which a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do.

—Robert A. Dahl
Democracy and Its Critics

Huber et Powell (1994)

In what we call the *Majority Control vision*, democratic elections are designed to create strong, single-party majority governments that are essentially unconstrained by other parties in the policy-making process. Policymakers are likely to do what citizens want them to do because the party that controls the government has won majority support in the election. Its announced policy comments, previous record, or both were preferred to the partisan alternative by a majority of the citizens. In the other vision, which we call the *Proportionate Influence vision*, elections are designed to produce legislatures that reflect the preferences of all citizens. After the election legislative bargaining between parties is necessary for policymaking, and the influences of the various parties in post-election bargaining processes determine the extent to which policymakers do what citizens want them to do.

In this paper, we offer a simple way to conceptualize the degree of congruence between citizens and their governments, comparing citizen self-placements on the left-right scale with the placement of the governing political parties on the same scale by expert observers. We

Huber et Powell (1994)

policy position that is in some sense “most preferred” by the voters. We believe that the position that has the best claim to represent this “most preferred” policy is the position of the median voter. On a single issue or a single-issue dimension, if we assume that the preferences of voters are single-peaked, the position of the median voter is the only policy that is preferred to all others by a majority of voters.³ Thus, the relationship between the positions of policymakers and the position of the median voter is central to the study of congruence.

The most common single dimension in modernized democracies is almost certainly the left-right ideological continuum. The language of “left” and “right” creates a unidimensional discourse that can assimilate the various issues and alternatives that continuously appear before the electorate.⁹ Studies show that elites, political experts, and mass publics are able to think about political issues using the language of left and right.¹⁰

Huber et Powell (1994)

<i>Process Stages</i>	<i>Majority Control Vision</i>	<i>Proportionate Influence Vision</i>
Electoral competition	identifiable alternative governments, one a responsible incumbent, one or both close to the median voter	wide range of party choice; absence of explicit coalition commitments
Election outcomes	party close to median voter wins majority	proportionate legislative representation of all parties and voters
Government formation	election winner forms majority government	bargaining: government coalition includes the median legislator
Policy-making between elections	government dominates all policy-making	coalitions may change but still include median; negotiation with opposition parties may help balance government parties right or left of median party
Congruence prediction	government is the policymaker and is close to the median voter	government includes median legislator, but average weight of all policymakers will be closer to the median voter

FIGURE 1
VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND PROCESSES THAT CREATE CONGRUENCE
BETWEEN VOTERS AND POLICYMAKERS

Huber et Powell (1994)

- 12 démocraties industrialisées
 - **AUS**, BLG, DNK, FR, All, IRL, ITL, PB, **NZ**, ES, SUE, **UK**.
 - 5 élections **majoritaires**, 12 élections mixtes et 10 élections *proportionnelles* entre 1978 et 1985.
- La première mesure de congruence (C1) est la distance entre la position pondéré du gouvernement et l'électeur médian.
- La deuxième mesure de congruence (C2) est la distance entre le parti médian au gouvernement et l'électeur médian.

Huber et Powell (1994)

TABLE 3

CONGRUENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
CITIZEN LEFT-RIGHT ORIENTATIONS^a

	<i>System Type</i>		
	<i>Majority Control</i>	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Proportional Influence</i>
Government Distance I	1.61 (28%)	1.43 (23%)	.96 (20%)
Government Distance II	1.61 (28%)	1.55 (25%)	1.03 (20%)
N	5	16	17

^aGovernment Distance I measures the difference between the weighted mean left-right position of the government and the left-right position of the median voter. Government Distance II measures the difference between the left-right position of the median party in the government coalition and the left-right position of the median citizen. The numbers in parentheses give the percentage of voters between the government and the median citizen. Positions of the parties are taken from Castles and Mair (fn.10).

Huber et Powell (1994)

TABLE 5

CONGRUENCE BETWEEN POLICYMAKERS AND
CITIZEN LEFT-RIGHT ORIENTATIONS^a

	<i>System Type</i>		
	<i>Majority Control</i>	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Proportionate Influence</i>
Policymaker Distance I	1.17 (22%)	1.03 (18%)	.50 (10%)
Policymaker Distance II	1.17 (22%)	1.15 (20%)	.59 (12%)

^aFor Policymaker Distance I and Policymaker Distance II, a party's weight is determined by whether it is a government party, a support party, or an opposition party. Policymaker Distance I uses the same measure as Government Distance I to calculate the position of the government. Policymaker Distance II uses the same measure as Government Distance II to calculate the position of the government. Further details are in the text and the appendix. The numbers in parentheses give the percentage of citizens between the Policymakers and the median citizens.

Critiques?

1. Théorie
2. Mesure
3. Données
4. Conclusion

Les données CSES

Le Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES)

The CSES is a collaborative program of research among election study teams from around the world. Participating countries and provinces include a common module of survey questions in their post-election studies. The resulting data are deposited along with voting, demographic, district and macro/electoral system variables. The studies are then merged into a single, free, public dataset for use in comparative study and cross-level analysis.

The research agenda, questionnaires, and study design are developed by an international committee of leading scholars of electoral politics, political science, and survey research. The design is then implemented in each country and province by their foremost social scientists.

Les données CSES

Le Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES)

	CSES Module 1 (1996-2001)	CSES Module 2 (2001-2006)	CSES Module 3 (2006-2011)	CSES Module 4 (2011-2016)
Collaborators	Module 1	Module 2	Module 3	Module 4
Election Studies	39	41	50	17
Countries/Provinces	33	38	41	17
Albania		2005		
Australia	1996	2004	2007	2013
Austria			2008	2013
Belarus	2001		2008	
Belgium	1999*,1999*	2003		
Brazil		2002	2006,2010	
Bulgaria		2001		
Canada	1997	2004	2008	
Chile	1999	2005	2009	
Croatia			2007	
Czech Republic	1996	2002	2006,2010	
Denmark	1998	2001	2007	
Estonia			2011	
Finland		2003	2007,2011	
France		2002	2007	2012
Germany	1998	2002*,2002*	2005,2009	2013
Great Britain	1997	2005		
Greece			2009	2012
Hong Kong	1998,2000	2004	2008	
Hungary	1998	2002		
Iceland	1999	2003	2007,2009	2013
Ireland		2002	2007	2011
Israel	1996	2003	2006	
Italy		2006		
Japan	1996	2004	2007	2013
Kyrgyzstan		2005		
Latvia			2010	
Lithuania	1997			
Mexico	1997,2000	2003	2006,2009	2012
Montenegro				2012
Netherlands	1998	2002	2006,2010	
New Zealand	1996	2002	2008	2011
Norway	1997	2001	2005,2009	
Peru	2000,2001	2006	2011	
Philippines		2004	2010	
Poland	1997	2001	2005,2007	2011
Portugal	2002*	2002*,2005	2009	

Romania	1996	2004	2009	
Russia	1999*,2000*	2004		
Serbia				2012
Slovakia			2010	
Slovenia	1996	2004	2008	
South Africa			2009	
South Korea	2000	2004	2008	
Spain	1996,2000	2004	2008	
Sweden	1998	2002	2006	
Switzerland	1999	2003	2007	2011
Taiwan	1996	2001,2004	2008	2012
Thailand	2001		2007	2011
Turkey			2011	
Ukraine	1998			
United States	1996	2004	2008	2012
Uruguay			2009	
	CSES Module 1 (1996-2001)	CSES Module 2 (2001-2006)	CSES Module 3 (2006-2011)	CSES Module 4 (2011-2016)

53 pays;
4 vagues;
147 élections.

Blais & Bodet (2006)

Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers?

André Blais

Marc André Bodet

Université de Montréal, Canada

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This article assesses the claim that proportional representation (PR) fosters a closer correspondence between the views of citizens and the positions of the government. The study uses the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data set and compares respondents' self-placements on a Left-Right scale with placements of cabinet parties' locations in 31 election studies. The authors argue that PR has two contradictory consequences. On one hand, PR leads to more parties and more choice for voters; but these parties are less centrist, and this increases the overall distance between voters and parties. On the other hand, PR increases the likelihood of coalition governments; this pulls the government toward the center of the policy spectrum and reduces the distance between the government and voters. These two contradictory effects of PR wash out, and the net overall impact of PR on congruence is nil. The data support the authors' interpretation.

Blais & Bodet (2006)

Why should we expect better congruence between citizens and policy makers in a PR system? The reasoning is that a greater variety of viewpoints will be represented in the legislature and government. The existing literature on electoral systems supports such an assertion. There is strong evidence that the number of parties in the legislature increases with the proportionality of the electoral system. Though social cleavages also matter, we find more parties in PR than in non-PR systems and more parties in systems with high district magnitude (and more proportional outcomes) than in those with small district magnitude (Cox, 1997; Katz, 1997; Lijphart, 1994).

The quality of representation, at least from a theoretical standpoint, should increase with the number of parties. An individual voter is more likely to find a party that expresses views similar to his or her own if there are 10 parties running in the election and actually represented in the legislature than if there are only 2. From the voter's perspective, many options ought to be better than few.

Blais & Bodet (2006)

The conclusion is that in PR and non-PR systems alike, there are pressures for the government to adopt positions that are close to those of the median voter and thus to minimize the distance between voters' wishes and public policy. In both systems, however, there is no guarantee of congruence. The median voter theorem assumes that voters "evaluate candidates and public policy on the basis of some small number (usually one, two, or three) of generalized issues (ideological or otherwise)" (Ordeshook, 1997, p. 260), so centrist pressures are weaker when the issues are multidimensional. Furthermore, parties or voters may fail to coordinate, and these coordination failures may allow an extremist government to form. But we see no compelling reason why one system would systematically produce more or less congruence.

Blais & Bodet (2006)

- 21 démocraties industrialisées
 - UK, CDN, AUS, POL, HON, IRL, ESP, BUL, POR, TCH, SLO, ALL, NOR, NZ, BEL, SUI, ISR, SUE, PB, ISL, DNK.
- 31 élections couvrant un large spectre de disproportionnalité (Gallagher 1991) entre 1996 et 2003, avec près de 50 000 répondants.

The second assumption, according to which experts and citizens' placements on the Left-Right scale can be meaningfully compared, seems to us more dubious. The citizens' and experts' surveys utilized by Powell and his colleagues (Huber & Powell, 1994; Powell, 2000; Powell & Vanberg, 2000) were conducted at different points in time. Furthermore, some surveys were

Blais & Bodet (2006)

- Usage des données du CSES où les répondants doivent se situer sur une échelle de 0 à 10 et situer les partis politiques sur cette même échelle.
- Le placement du parti est la valeur médiane donnée par les répondants lors d'une élection donnée.
- Concentration sur les régimes parlementaires et sur les chambres basses.
- La **congruence** est la distance moyenne entre l'électeur et la position du gouvernement (médianes pondérées).

Blais & Bodet (2006)

- L'hypothèse centrale:

Dans les systèmes proportionnels, les partis représentés en chambre sont plus dispersés sur l'échelle gauche/droite. Mais la formation du gouvernement de coalition se fait autour du parti médian et de l'électeur médian. Dans les systèmes majoritaires, les partis représentés en chambre sont concentrés autour du centre, et donc proche de l'électeur médian.

Blais & Bodet (2006)

Table 5
Disproportionality and Congruence

Independent Variable	<u>Cabinet Distance (Φ_j)</u>	
	Coefficient	Robust <i>SE</i>
Disproportionality	-3.0713	2.2395
Old democracy	-0.6642	0.3898
Constant	2.9627**	0.4284
R^2	.1752	
N	31	

*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%.

Critiques?

1. Théorie
2. Mesure
3. Données
4. Conclusion

Powell (2009)

The Ideological Congruence Controversy

The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
University of Rochester, New York

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Focusing on the left-right scale as a summary measure of citizens' and representatives' preferences, a growing body of literature has used a variety of approaches and data in measuring positions of citizens and representatives. The most recent studies, contrary to previous ones, show no significant difference between ideological congruence in single member district (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. This article examines the major alternative measurement approaches and data sets, finding that recent results are due to differences in time period, not differences in measurement approach. The associations between election rules and ideological congruence are relatively robust to various measurement approaches, as are estimations of the causal processes shaping ideological congruence. The association between election rules and congruence has declined in the past decade, as shown by all three major approaches, due primarily to convergence toward the median of plurality parties in the SMD elections.

Powell (2009)

However, two new empirical studies (Blais & Bodet, 2006; Golder & Stramski, 2007) reject these findings and argue that there is no consistent advantage for PR systems in promoting ideological congruence. Interestingly enough, the new studies generally adopt the same theoretical reasoning about the emergence of congruence under PR and SMD that had been previously proposed. They agree that the causal mechanisms creating correspondence are somewhat different under the different systems but find no reason to expect one to be superior to the other. Both studies argue that the new cross-national data provided by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project enable superior measurement of citizen and representative congruence. They explicitly suggest that previous findings should be considered superseded by the new ones because of these improved measures.

The main approaches to measuring congruence are here summarized as the citizen survey/expert survey approach (*cit-ex*), the party vote/party manifesto approach (*manifesto*), and the citizen identification/citizen perception (*cit-perc*) approach. Each of these has been praised and criticized; each has strengths and weaknesses.

Powell (2009)

Thus, we have three substantially different methods applied to the ideological congruence measurement problem. The challenging Blais and Bodet (2006) and Golder and Stramski (2007) studies are based on different methods, involving a different data set and a different time period. They even involve somewhat different countries, although there is a great deal of overlap. Are the new results, finding no difference between congruence in PR and non-PR systems, a consequence of their different (perhaps superior) method of estimating congruence, getting citizens and parties on the same scale by using citizen perceptions? Or is it the different time period? If the latter, why should that make any difference? I began completely uncertain about the answer but now believe that the critical difference lies in the time periods rather than in the differing balances of advantages and disadvantages of the methods:

Powell (2009)

in this decade. I am glad to report that I was able to replicate the Blais and Bodet (2006) results very closely, with all substantive and significant results

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Powell / Ideological Congruence 1481

the same, and to replicate the Golder and Stramski (2007) results exactly. So the following results are not based on differences in treatment of the CSES data.²

Powell (2009)

Table 1
Government Ideological Congruence in Proportional Representation (PR) and Single Member District (SMD) Systems: By Time Period and Estimation Method^a

Election		Ideological Distance: Median Citizen and Government					
Decade	Election Rules	Manifesto Method	N	Citizen-Expert	N	Citizen Perception	N
1945–1955	PR	12.4	43	—			
	SMD	15.2	16	—			
1956–1965	PR	9.0	38	—			
	SMD	7.8	15	—			
1966–1975	PR	10.5	38	—			
	SMD	11.8	19	—			
1976–1985	PR	7.9	47	13.7	27	—	
	SMD	13.1	14	18.9	10	—	
1986–1995	PR	6.9	46	10.1	33	—	
	SMD	15.7	12	18.6	10		
1996–2004	PR	8.0	31	13.4	22	13.0	28
	SMD	5.9	9	10.9	7	9.4	7
Total	PR	9.1	243	12.2	82	13.0	28
	SMD	11.9	85	16.7	27	9.4	7

a. In the manifesto data set the 85 SMD elections are in Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand (through 1993), and France after 1956 and not in 1986; the 243 PR elections are in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France (1946-1956 and 1986), Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand (1996, 1999, 2001), Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Italy is counted as PR, although in 1994, 1996, and 2001 the majority of seats were SMD with only partial compensation. In the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data set the 7 SMD elections are in Australia, Britain, Canada, and France; the 28 PR elections are in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In all tables the manifesto data estimate the median voter position, whereas the other methods estimate the median citizen position.

Golder & Stramski (2010)

Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions

Matt Golder Florida State University

Jacek Stramski Florida State University

Although the literature examining the relationship between ideological congruence and electoral rules is quite large, relatively little attention has been paid to how congruence should be conceptualized. As we demonstrate, empirical results regarding ideological congruence can depend on exactly how scholars conceptualize and measure it. In addition to clarifying various aspects of how scholars currently conceptualize congruence, we introduce a new conceptualization and measure of congruence that captures a long tradition in democratic theory emphasizing the ideal of having a legislature that accurately reflects the preferences of the citizenry as a whole. Our new measure is the direct counterpart for congruence of the vote-seat disproportionality measures so heavily used in comparative studies of representation. Using particularly appropriate data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we find that governments in proportional democracies are not substantively more congruent than those in majoritarian democracies. Proportional democracies are, however, characterized by more representative legislatures.

Golder & Stramski (2010)


several plausible ways to conceptualize congruence. As we demonstrate, empirical results regarding ideological congruence can depend on exactly how scholars conceptualize and measure it. For example, scholars who conceptualize congruence purely in terms of the ideological distance between the median citizen and the government (absolute congruence) can rank the congruence of governments very differently from those who also take account of the dispersion of citizen preferences (relative congruence). This in itself is not necessarily a problem if how one conceptualizes congruence is theoretically or question driven—one simply chooses the conceptualization that is most appropriate for the research question at hand. For instance, we will argue that a concept of *relative* congruence is typically more appropriate for scholars interested in evaluating how well representatives are performing at producing congruence than the more common concept of *absolute* congruence. To a large extent, though, existing studies do not explicitly address how ideological

Golder & Stramski (2010)

- Congruence (1 to 1): Congruence is high when the absolute distance between the citizen and the representative is small.
- Absolute median citizen congruence (M to 1): Congruence is high when the absolute distance between the **median** citizen and the representative is small.
- Absolute citizen congruence (M to 1): Congruence is high when the **average** absolute distance between the citizens and the representative is small.
- Relative citizen congruence (M to 1): Congruence is high when the absolute distance between the citizens and their representative is small relative to the **dispersion** of citizen preferences.
- Congruence (M to M): Congruence is high when the **distribution** of citizen and representative preferences are similar; it is perfect when the two distributions are identical.

Golder & Stramski (2010)

FIGURE 3 Measuring Many-to-Many Congruence



Golder & Stramski (2010)

TABLE 1 Mean Levels of Many-to-One Congruence by Electoral System Type

Dependent Variable	Proportional Systems	Majoritarian Systems	Significantly Different?
<i>Absolute Congruence</i>			
ABSOLUTE MEDIAN CITIZEN CONGRUENCE	1.46 (0.97)	1.06 (0.83)	NO
ABSOLUTE CITIZEN CONGRUENCE	2.25 (0.49)	1.89 (0.41)	YES
<i>Relative Congruence</i>			
RELATIVE CITIZEN CONGRUENCE	0.17 (0.13)	0.17 (0.14)	NO
Observations	31	7	

Notes: Lower scores indicate greater congruence. Parentheses indicate standard deviations. “Significantly Different?” means at the 0.10 significance level (two-tailed). ABSOLUTE MEDIAN CITIZEN CONGRUENCE captures the absolute distance between the median citizen and the government; ABSOLUTE CITIZEN CONGRUENCE captures the average distance between the citizens and the government; RELATIVE CITIZEN CONGRUENCE captures the average distance of a citizen from the citizens’ most preferred position relative to the average distance between a citizen and the government.

Golder & Stramski (2010)

- Par contre, les systèmes proportionnels affiche une meilleure congruence entre les électeurs et les législateurs (M to M).
- Donc... si on valorise uniquement la congruence entre les électeurs et le gouvernement en place, on peut opter pour un système majoritaire et ainsi profiter des gains en imputabilité.
- Mais... si on valorise également la congruence avec les législateurs, le système proportionnel a un avantage certain.

Autres répliques empiriques

- **Golder & Lloyd** (2014) montrent que les conclusions de Powell (2009) ne sont rien de plus qu'un artéfact statistique. Lorsque le modèle corrige pour les cas multiples, l'avantage « dans la durée » des systèmes proportionnels disparaît, tout comme la variabilité des régimes majoritaires.
- **Ferland** (2016) confirme les conclusions de Blais et Bodet (2016) et de Golder et coll. (2010, 2014) à l'aide de 83 élections dans 13 pays, entre 1973 et 2012. Par contre, il ajoute que les systèmes proportionnels demeurent en général près de l'électeur médian lorsqu'on s'éloigne de l'élection mais que les conclusions en début de mandat tiennent pour tous les systèmes.

Où en sommes nous?

Linking Party Preferences and the Composition of Government: A New Standard for Evaluating the Performance of Electoral Democracy*

ANDRÉ BLAIS, ERIC GUNTERMANN AND MARC A. BODET

We propose a new standard for evaluating the performance of electoral democracies: the correspondence between citizens' party preferences and the party composition of governments that are formed after elections. We develop three criteria for assessing such correspondence: the proportion of citizens whose most preferred party is in government, whether the party that is most liked overall is in government, and how much more positively governing parties are rated than non-governing parties. We pay particular attention to the last criterion, which takes into account how each citizen feels about each of the parties as well as the intensity of their preferences. We find that proportional representation systems perform better on the first criterion. Majoritarian systems do better on the other two.

TABLE 2 *Main Results*

	Non-PR	PR	Overall
Proportion most liked in cabinet (%)	42.70	50.20	49.50
Most liked party overall in cabinet	100.00	85.10	87.40
Evaluation of governing versus opposition parties	1.03	0.97	0.99
<i>N</i>	10	74	87

Note: PR = proportional representation.

Convaincus?
Pourquoi?

Mes conclusions

- Je ne suis pas convaincu que nous avons de bonnes mesures empiriques...
- Le choix des cas n'est pas rigoureux...
- La participation et la satisfaction envers les institutions démocratiques sont plus élevées dans les systèmes proportionnels. Pourquoi?